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Abstract: Although Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes’s macroeconomics and
essential message clashes with authoritative alternative interpretations, it has
become increasingly influential during the years following the Global Financial
Crisis, even in mainstream circles. This paper offers a critical evaluation of
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis from the perspective of the alternative
Austro-Wicksellian paradigm. Although some of the similarities and/or analo-
gies between Minsky’s approach and that of the Austrian School suggest a more
than merely superficial affinity between the two theoretical frameworks and
although some scope for cross-fertilization between both approaches can be
found, both theoretically and empirically, at a fundamental conceptual level
both theories remain incompatible and difficult if not impossible to reconcile, in
particular in terms of fundamental causality and in terms of policy conclusions
and prescriptions. Despite the fact that Minsky’s policy conclusions are multi-
faceted and somewhat eclectic, they manifest a lack of familiarity with the
conclusions of the Austrian analysis of the problems of central planning by
Big Players such as Big Bank and Big Government. Both approaches also offer
contrasting interpretations of the historical experience of the Global Financial
Crisis.
Keywords: Austrian School, Minsky, Keynes, Global Financial Crisis, Financial
Fragility, Financial Instability, Heterodox Macroeconomics, Financial Reform,
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1 Introduction: The Global Financial Crisis
and Heterodox Macroeconomics
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (hereafter GFC) and the subsequent
Great Recession a widespread perception has prevailed that orthodox economics
proved useless in predicting, tackling or even imagining the biggest financial
debacle in the world’s most advanced economies for eighty years and that this
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fact constitutes clear evidence of a systemic failure of the economics profession
(Colander et al. 2011; Kates 2010, 2011; Rodriguez, Turmo, and Vara 2014; Wolf
2014).1
According to Minsky, economics should include the possibility of severe
crises, not as the result of external shocks, but as events that emerge from within
the system. Crises, according to Minsky, have proved a persistent feature of
capitalist economies. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (hereafter FIH) is
a model of a capitalist economy which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to
generate business cycles of varying severity: the hypothesis contends that
historical business cycles are compounded out of the internal dynamics of
capitalist economies as well as out of the system of interventions and regula-
tions designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable bounds
(Minsky 1994 [2012] 547).2
No less pertinent has been the approach of economists of the Austrian
School in explaining and understanding the events leading up to the GFC and
the following economic recession (Cachanosky and Salter 2013). It has not
always been clearly perceived, however, whether the post-Keynesian and
Austrian accounts are complementary, partly complementary and partly incom-
patible, or entirely incompatible.3
1 The GFC is now treated in most orthodox macroeconomics textbooks from the perspective of
the conventional IS-LM and AD-AS frameworks and the information contained therein is often
useful. See e. g. Blanchard, Amighini, and Giavazzi (2010); Gordon (2012); Mishkin (2013),
Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010). In this paper I will consider two heterodox approaches
to interpreting the GFC, its causes, consequences and policy implications. In particular the
heterodox approach of the late Hyman Minsky had become prominent in terms of influence and
prestige among interpreters of the GFC that began in 2007–8. I will here adopt a critical
perspective with respect to Minsky’s approach from the standpoint of Austrian economics. It
is not difficult to document the growing influence of Minsky’s economics since the Global
Financial Crisis. Clearly the mainstream has discovered Minsky (Wray 2016, 8 ff.). See also:
Bhattacharya et al. (2011); D’Apice and Ferri (2010); Eggertsson and Krugman (2012); Flanders
(2015); Rosser, Rosser, and Gallegati (2012). Richard C. Koo, in his much acclaimed (2015), cites
Minsky as one among very few economists who have seriously addressed the problem of asset
bubbles. Since most readers of this journal will be familiar with the Austrian theory of the
business cycle, I will not present an elaborate account of its basic features. Reference can be
made to, among others, Garrison (2001; 2005) and Huerta de Soto (2012). The relevant works of
Mises and Hayek, as explained and discussed in Huerta de Soto (2012), remain required reading.
2 In very general terms Minsky followed Marx but, as explained further, it is not a realization
crisis that is the outcome of this process but rather a validation crisis in which the commitments
on financial liabilities can no longer be met from current income (also Kregel 2013).
3 See e. g. Vikram Mansharamani who writes that “(t)he Austrian business cycle theory is
similar in many respects to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis” (2011, 36).
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At least one author has suggested that both approaches are complementary
rather than incompatible. Writing about the financial crisis, Leijonhufvud (2009,
742) indeed observes:
Operating an interest targeting regime keying on the consumer price index (CPI), the Fed
was lured into keeping interest rates far too low for far too long. The result was inflation of
asset prices combined with a general deterioration of credit quality (….). This, of course,
does not make a Keynesian story. Rather, it is a variation on the Austrian overinvestment
(or malinvestment) theme. But Mises and Hayek had very little to say about the financial
side of an overinvestment boom that is of interest to us 80 years later. For a thorough
analysis of that subject one has to turn to Human Minsky.
Resolving this issue in greater detail requires taking a closer look at the specifics
of the respective theories. A critical attempt will therefore here be made not only
to analyze apparent analogies as well as divergences between both approaches,
but also to suggest a few lines of possible future research by indicating areas
where some cross-fertilization between both approaches or even a partial theo-
retical integration of both theories seems possible.4
2 Setting the Scene: Keynes, Minsky,
and the Austrian School
2.1 Keynes versus the Austrian School
The Hayek/Keynes debate, which is conventionally dated to have begun with
Hayek’s two-part review of Keynes’ Treatise on Money, was at least in part a
continuation of 19th controversies concerning the role of saving, public spend-
ing, private investment, and budget deficits (Hayek 1931–2; Keynes 1930 [2011];
O’Driscoll 2011). Although there is little evidence from contemporary debates on
these issues that the monetary debates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
ever took place (O’Driscoll 2011, 36), and although most of the recently emerging
models have come from a more or less “Keynesian” perspective, it has been
argued that an alternative “Hayekian” path might be taken and that Austrian
approaches to macroeconomics are now more likely to resonate with
4 The motivation or rationale for such an exercise may seem weak but this impression is
mistaken. Austrian economists may remember how Hayek finally regretted never having
reviewed Keynes’ General Theory; they should not now neglect paying due attention to
Minsky’s increasingly influential work. On Hayek versus Keynes, see also Backhouse (2014).
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mainstream economists than in years past (Koppl and Luther 2012; Cachanosky
and Salter 2013).
Recently attempts have been made to link Austrian and Keynesian econom-
ics by integrating the time structure of production and the Hayekian triangles
with the Keynesian consumption function as drawn from the Samuelsonian
“neo-classical synthesis” (Garrison 1978; Skousen 2015). Although this approach
has become a recurring theme in part of the Austrian literature, this construction
can be questioned on the ground that, as is well known, several interpretations
of Keynes’ General Theory exist as well as major differences between interpreters
about the meaning of the book and its central message. Since the GFC it has
become increasingly doubtful whether the “neo-classical synthesis” adequately
captures the essence of Keynes’ intended message. From this perspective the
Skousen-Garrison construction is perhaps more a Hayek-Samuelson synthesis
than a Hayek-Keynes synthesis!
A more fertile conceptual framework for studying dynamically unsustain-
able processes is provided by Wicksell’s (1936 [1965]) model of cumulative
expansions and contractions, which was taken over by a large number of
economists in the early twentieth century; both Hayek, in his business cycle
model, and Keynes, in his Treatise on Money are to be mentioned in this context.
Indeed the so-called Wicksell Connection – or Austro-Wicksellian Connection –
has been held responsible for a fundamental convergence of the respective
theories of Hayek and Keynes about money, capital, and the business cycle
during the course of the 1930s. This affinity effectively ended thereafter, how-
ever, and the Wicksell Connection is largely absent from modern mainstream
macro (Goodspeed 2012).5
5 Generally, the Wicksellian connection consists of three primary and tightly interrelated
themes. The first is that money matters. The core of the Wicksell Connection, in contrast to
all approaches of Walrasian descent, consists in the integration of real with monetary analysis.
This ingredient is intimately related to the second element of the Wicksell Connection, namely,
the identification of intertemporal coordination as the central problem in macroeconomics. The
Wicksellian economy is one that gives full scope to potential coordination failures, with the
“dark forces of time and ignorance”, poised always to disrupt the coincidence of saving and
investment. The third and final theme constituting the Wicksell Connection relates to the fact
that the problem of intertemporal coordination of economic activity is inextricably bound up
with questions concerning the dispersion, acquisition, and distribution of information and
knowledge. See also Leijonhufvud (1981a, 131–202). Leijonhufvud (1981b, 133) had proposed a
grouping of macroeconomic theorists along two separate traditions labeled “Saving-Investment
Theories” and “Quantity Theory.” Keynes is categorized by Leijonhufvud as a Wicksellian. This
categorization had been questioned and rejected by Garrison (1992, 144). Minsky’s own inter-
pretation of Keynes differs markedly both from that of Garrison and from that of Leijonhufvud.
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2.2 Keynes versus Minsky
Post-Keynesian economists distinguish themselves by two characteristics:
among interpreters of Keynes’ work they are the most active group emphasizing
expectations and uncertainty as the driving force in the General Theory, and
they combine this emphasis with intense concentration on their own choice of
a favorite chapter, Chapter 17 – “The Essential Properties of Interest and
Money” – and on the role of money in “finance” (Meltzer 1988, 285). Minsky
is no exception. Minsky believes, however, that Keynes’ discussion in Chapter
17, though perceptive, is flawed because Keynes does not explicitly introduce
liability structures and the payment commitments they entail (Minsky 1975
[2008]). Therefore Minsky describes his task as follows:
In order to bring out the power of the ideas involved, we will undertake to adjust the
argument of chapter 17 by explicitly considering liability structures and by setting the
argument in a cyclical and speculative framework. As modified by these considerations,
the argument of chapter 17 gives us the ingredients for an explanation of a speculative
investment boom and of why such a boom contains, in the development of a crisis-prone
setup, the seeds of its own destruction. (1975 [2008], 77)
It has been argued that Minsky was not the interpreter of Keynes that he
supposed himself to be and that his FIH must be considered as an extension
or a reformulation, and not an “interpretation”, of Keynes. Much like the
Austrian theory, Minsky’s theory is indeed a theory of the upper turning point.
Keynes’ perplexities instead focus on the lower turning point. Minsky “combats”
the upswing, Keynes the downswing (De Antoni 2010). Although Minsky’s
cyclical rereading of The General Theory clashes with authoritative alternative
interpretations, he seems to have believed that his own interpretation is most
faithful to the true vision and message of Keynes.
2.3 Minsky versus the Austrian School
The idea of a boom containing “the seeds of its own undoing (or destruction)” is
indeed also very characteristic of typical formulations of the Austrian theory of
boom and bust. The impression that Minsky’s interpretation of the General
Theory thus yields a variant of Keynesian business cycle theorizing not unlike
and in some respects even analogous to the Austrian theory is not entirely
mistaken. Nevertheless this observation is subject to some qualifications and
reservations. In fact, despite certain similarities and analogies, especially con-
cerning the role of money and banking institutions in the context of the business
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cycle, and despite Minsky’s providing what is clearly a cyclical reading of the
General Theory, his work does not fit very well into the framework of the Wicksell
Connection.
A central element of the Wicksell Connection relates to the identification of
inter-temporal coordination and the role of the interest-rate mechanism in this
respect as the most important problem in macroeconomics. Although Minsky’s
analysis confirms the standard negative relationship between investment and
the interest rate, in his scheme interest rates play a secondary role. Dominating
the scene are the other determinants of investment, in particular profit expec-
tations and confidence. Austrians do not reject theorizing about the role of
confidence or “animal spirits” per se but argue that we need to look more
carefully at the way in which Big Players in the economic system can affect
confidence as a result of their dominance (Koppl 2014, 130–1). The view that
will be held here is thus that Minsky’s Wicksellian pedigree is somewhat
doubtful.6
Minsky took inspiration from Fisher’s debt-deflation theory which clearly
influenced his own debt-deflation theory (Fisher 1933; Minsky 1986 [2008], 192).
Minsky’s debt-deflation theory emphasizes the role of the asset market. As in
Fisher’s explanation, distress selling can be self-defeating, as when the asset
market and distress selling feedback on each other. The fall in asset prices
reinforces deflation via a negative wealth effect. This process can result in a
recursive debt-deflation process. The Austrian theory to the contrary is not a
theory of depression per se but rather a theory of the unsustainable boom.
Austrians recognize that self-reversing changes in the capital structure may
give way to a self-aggravating downward spiral in both income and spending,
which was described by Hayek as the “secondary depression (or deflation)” – in
recognition of the fact that the primary problem was something else: the inter-
temporal misallocation of resources (Hayek 1979, 40–41; Garrison 2001, 75).
While Austrians acknowledge the fact that a bad situation can get worse, they
would generally argue that the self-aggravating downward spiral leading into
deep depression is to be explained by significant government intervention on
several levels thwarting market adjustment by constraining exchange
opportunities.
In order to facilitate a critical evaluation of Minsky’s model, in the next
section a stylized account of Minsky’s FIH will be presented.
6 The reader will look in vain for a single reference to Wicksell in Minsky’s three books. Detzer
and Herr (2015, 115) argue, in contrast, that Minsky followed the Wicksellian approach.
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3 Minsky’s FIH versus Austrian Business Cycle
Theory: Contrasting Explanations of Dynamic
Unsustainability and the Upper Turning Point
in Business Cycles
The two cornerstones of Minsky’s analysis are his “financial theory of invest-
ment” which considers the ways in which investment is financed, and the
cumulative processes.7 The core of Minsky’s analysis is a financial theory of
investment according to which investment is essentially driven by: (i) the
difference between the market price of capital goods in place and the current
price of investments goods; (ii) the volume of internal finance. The expansion of
the firm depends on its accumulation of capital out of current profits (also
Kalecki 1965 [2009], 92). As to the first factor, “(p)rices of capital assets depend
upon current views of future profit (quasi-rent) flows and the current subjective
value placed upon the insurance against uncertainty embodied in money or
quick cash: these current views depend upon expectations that are held about
the longer run development of the economy. The prices of current output are
based upon current views of near term demand conditions and current knowl-
edge of money wage rates. Thus the prices of current output (…) depend upon
shorter run expectations. Capital-asset and current output prices are based upon
expectations over quite different time horizons: capital output prices reflect long
run expectations and current output prices reflect short term expectations”
(Minsky 1982, 94–5). As to the second factor, Minsky notes that the investment
which can be debt financed today depends on the cash flows expected by both
borrowers (firms) and lenders (banks) tomorrow. The higher the realized cash flow
relative to debt commitments, the higher the rate of fulfillment of contracts, which
positively affects the state of confidence of both bankers and business people and
leads to a higher volume of investment being financed and carried out.
Minsky’s theory of investment determination can be illustrated with the help
of Figure 1. The quantity of capital is measured on the x-axis and the “prices” of
capital on the y-axis. Minsky draws a distinction between the supply price of
investment goods – which we assume for simplicity to be equal to the average
7 In this section I will provide a summary statement of Minsky’s analysis of financial fragility
and instability. The post-Keynesian literature contains several excellent summaries which I
have used freely, besides Minsky’s three books. See in particular: Assenza, Delli Gatti, and
Gallegati 2010; Bellofiore and Ferri 2001a, 2001c; De Antoni 2010; Fazzari and Papadimitriou
1992; Kregel 2013; Mehrling 1999; Papadimitriou and Wray 2010; Wray 2016; among others.
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price level (P) – and the market price of capital assets (V), which can be thought
of as the present value of the stream of expected quasi rent per unit of capital.
By assumption the latter coincides with the stock price. Investment can be
financed in part by means of internally generated funds, which coincide with
net worth (A) and in part by external finance. For a given price of newly
produced capital goods (say P0) and a given level of internal finance (say A0)
we can determine the maximum volume of investment which can be financed by
means of internal funds K0 =A0. By assumption, the quasi rent is increasing with
the volume of net worth. Hence we can compute the market price V0 as an
increasing function of A0 (Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Gallegati 2010, 185). If the
firm chooses a level of investment greater than K0, it has to raise funds on the
credit market. In this case banks have to be remunerated for the risk they
assume (lender’s risk), so that the actual supply price of investment goods for
the borrowing firm is higher than the price of newly produced capital goods P0.
The schedule of the actual price of investment goods (P schedule), therefore, is
flat at P0 until the maximum volume of internally financed investment K0 is
reached and is increasing thereafter. Symmetrically, if the firm chooses a level of
investment greater than K0, the risk of bankruptcy for the firm (borrower’s risk)
increases and the expected quasi rent decreases so that the actual stock price is
lower than the original one V0. The schedule of the actual market price of
investment goods (V schedule), therefore, is flat at V0 until the maximum
volume of internally financed investment K0 is reached and is decreasing
thereafter.
The equilibrium volume of investment (K*) and the equilibrium price of
investment goods (V*) are determined at the intersection of the upward sloping
schedule representing the supply price of investment augmented by lender’s risk
and the downward sloping schedule which describes the market price of capital
goods augmented by borrower’s risk. Equilibrium investment depends upon the
P schedule  V schedule
V
V*
P
A0 A1 K* K 
Figure 1: Minsky’s Two-Price Theory of Investment.
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volume of internal finance and on the degree of borrower’s and lender’s risk
which affect the slopes of the V and P schedules: K* = K(A0). An increase in
the availability of internal funds from A0 to A1 brings about an outward shift
of both the V and P schedules and an increase of investment as shown in
Figure 1.
The FIH is based on the distinction between hedge, speculative and Ponzi
units; “(f)or hedge financing units, the cash flows from participation in income
production are expected to exceed the contractual payments on outstanding
debts in every period. For speculative financing units, the total expected cash
flows from participation in income production when totaled over the foreseeable
future exceed the total cash payments on outstanding debt, but the near term
payment commitments exceed the near term cash flows from participation in
income production, even though the net income portion of the near term cash
flows (…) exceeds the near term interest payments on debt. A Ponzi finance unit
is a speculative financing unit for which the income component of the near term
cash flows falls short of the near term interest payments on debt so that for some
time in the future the outstanding debt will grow due to interest on existing debt.
Both speculative and Ponzi units can fulfill their payment commitments on
debts only by borrowing (or disposing of assets)” (Minsky 1982, 22–3). In a
“tranquil era” both borrowers and lenders expect future cash flows to be more
than enough to validate debt. Asset prices, which incorporate these expecta-
tions, increase relative to the price of current output, stimulating investments
which in turn drive up output, profits and employment. Minsky’s cumulative
processes, based on the interdependence between investment and profits, come
into play. The interdependence between investment and profits becomes the
basis of an upward spiral involving all the variables, with the exception of
borrower and lender risks, which fall with expansionary effects on investment.
The increasing debt is thus associated with decreasing safety margins. As the
real sector grows, the financial system becomes more and more fragile. Banks
are less cautious in extending credit and firms are less cautious in borrowing. As
a consequence hedge units, that is, borrowers who are able to service debt in
each and every period of the time horizon of their financial contracts, become
speculative units. Borrowers who were speculative units, in turn, become Ponzi
units, that is, they have to borrow in order to service outstanding debt. As the
proportion of hedge units in the population of borrowers decreases, financial
fragility increases. In this heterogeneous agents’ setting, the increase of aggre-
gate financial fragility during the expansion is due to the change of the structure
of the economy, the weight of hedge units shrinking over time. When the
perception spreads that in the aggregate cash flows do not validate debt any
more, the network of financial relations collapses and a financial crisis sets in
Understanding Financial Instability 9
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(Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Gallegati 2010, 189). When cash commitments on debt
cannot be met, financial fragility becomes financial instability (also Kregel 2013).
Minsky thus points to two drawbacks to the investment boom. First is its
increasingly speculative nature. In the general euphoria, firms’ debt commit-
ments increase faster than profits and eventually exceed them. Expecting a
future bonanza, firms start financing their principal by resort to debt (specula-
tive financing) and then even interest payments (ultra-speculative or Ponzi
financing). Thus an initially robust financial system becomes fragile. In fact,
an endogenous evolutionary process leads to a reduction of margins of safety,
without any necessity for euphoria or excessive optimism: increasingly optimis-
tic expectations of the ability to meet cash commitments in a cyclical expansion
represent a rational reaction to the evaluation of past events, as expressed in
higher probabilities of success (Kregel 2008). Second is that the persistence of
the boom inevitably creates either bottlenecks in the financial system or
inflationary pressures in the goods market that end up requiring a monetary
restriction. In either case, the result is a rise in the rate of interest (De Antoni
2010, 468–9). The higher interest rate ends the boom, and the investment-
profit-investment chain reverts to a downward spiral. More generally the
inevitability of the upper turning point is explained in Minsky’s theory by
pointing out that a crisis can occur if finance costs rise, if liquidity preference
rises, or if income flows turn out to be less than expected. Endogenous
processes tend to ensure that one of these (or all three) will, in fact, occur
(also Wray 1992, 167–8).
Minsky’s preoccupation with the upswing constitutes an important point of
analogy between his theory of the business cycle and the Austrian theory. The
assumptions from which both theories proceed and the particular elements that
have to be put together in order to allow for an explanation of the upper turning
point are clearly different in both approaches, however. In particular, while any
explicit reference to the Wicksellian framework is absent from Minsky’s concep-
tual approach, the Austrians clearly descend from the Wicksell Connection. As
hinted at already, Leijonhufvud had made the simple but fundamental point
that “the theory of the interest rate mechanism is the center of the confusion in
modern macroeconomics” (1981b, 131). In Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative
process, the maladjustment of the interest rate – the discrepancy between the
market rate and the natural rate – is the central idea. Use of the saving-
investment approach to income fluctuations is predicated on the hypothesis
that the interest rate mechanism fails to coordinate saving and investment
decisions appropriately (Leijonhufvud 1981b, 132). The Austrian theory of the
business cycle clearly shows how a lowering of the market rate of interest below
the natural rate will set the economy on an unsustainable growth path. In
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particular the Austrian theory of the business cycle emerges from a straightfor-
ward comparison of savings-induced growth which is sustainable, with a credit-
induced boom, which is not sustainable. Whereas saving entails genuine
growth, credit expansion leads to boom and bust. The focus of the theory is
the intertemporal discoordination – a general mismatch between intertemporal
consumption and saving preferences and intertemporal production plans – and
hence the inevitable crisis and downturn. The market is capable of allocating
resources in conformity with intertemporal preferences on the basis of a market-
determined (natural) rate of interest. It follows that an interest rate substantially
influenced by extra-market forces will lead to an intertemporal misallocation of
resources. Special attention is thus given to the extra-market forces that initiate
the boom and the market’s own self-correcting forces that turn boom into bust.
Whereas increased saving lowers the rate of interest and gives rise to a genuine
boom, by contrast a falsified interest rate that mimics the loan market conditions
of a genuine boom but is not accompanied by the requisite savings gives rise to
an artificial boom, one whose artificiality is eventually revealed by the market’s
reaction to excessively future-oriented production activities in conditions of
insufficient saving. Misallocations are followed by reallocations (Garrison
2001, 2005).
4 Further Discussion: Analogies and Divergences
4.1 Disaggregating the Business Cycle and Providing
Macroeconomics with Adequate Micro-Foundations
There are both macroeconomic and microeconomic aspects to financial fragility
(Tymoigne and Wray 2014, 21–2). Both Minsky and the Austrians are sensitive to
the requirement that macroeconomic theories should be provided with adequate
micro-foundations. In his doctoral dissertation Minsky had already emphasized
“the need to relate aggregate analysis to the behavior of economic units”
(Minsky 2004, 17). In particular, the relation between investment and the beha-
vior of individual firms is investigated. Without any doubt he thus intended to
embrace a disaggregated approach to the study of business cycles. Minsky
considered his approach in the dissertation to lay the micro-foundation for
determining macro performance. The dissertation is a microeconomic analysis
of firm behavior encompassing the various decision-making processes regarding
entry, market structure, expansion, vulnerability and survival (Papadimitriou
2004, x).
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In Minsky’s theory of investment determination, all the determinants of
investment can be firm-specific. Moreover, although Minsky’s theory of invest-
ment determination can be formulated without explicit reference to heterogene-
ity, at a deeper and more significant level Minsky’s ideas can be properly
expressed only in an heterogeneous agents’ setting considering the distinction
among hedge, speculative and Ponzi units on which the FIH is based. Assenza,
Delli Gatti, and Gallegati (2010) provide an example of a macroeconomic model
in which firms are characterized by heterogeneous financial conditions at the
firm level, thus implementing a disaggregated approach to the study of business
cycles by looking at how the structure of the economy evolves over the course of
the cycle. The role of heterogeneous financial conditions is the part of Minsky’s
legacy that is thus becoming the cornerstone of a new research agenda.
Austrian theorizing has also been very sensitive to issues of excessive aggre-
gation. Austrian economists have generally been critical of conventional macro-
economists’ primary focus on aggregate magnitudes and their abstracting from
individual market participants and their interactions. The fundamental method of
Austrian economic theory has been characterized as “methodological individual-
ism”. Economic events can only be explained in terms of individual human
actions, which means that the phenomena of the trade cycle are to be explained
in terms of the responses of individuals in the system to price signals (Hayek 1933
[2008]). Minsky, however, does not seem to consistently embrace methodological
individualism. Although micro-founded, Minsky’s analysis must be interpreted
more as a macro-foundation of microeconomics than vice versa. This means that
his route has been macro-micro-macro: he starts from the determination of
aggregate demand and total gross profits in the period, together with the liability
structure inherited from the past; then he looks at the micro consequences of the
current ratio of gross capital income and cash-payment commitments on indivi-
dual choices about financing and investment; and finally he reconstructs the
macro effects on the system’s evolutionary dynamics (Bellofiore and Ferri
2001a, 24). Nor has Minsky’s approach been exempt from critique. Minsky impli-
citly assumes that the actual investment gearing ratio between external and
internal financing aligns itself with the desired, thus rising pro-cyclically in the
upswing and falling in the downswing. As investment increases, external finan-
cing grows faster than internal. As a consequence, the incidence of debt commit-
ments on profits rises: finance becomes less hedge and more speculative.
Minsky’s line of reasoning here is questionable, however. The good performance
of the real sector (profits included) might strengthen rather than weaken the
financial sector (De Antoni 2010, 465). Minsky’s analysis apparently presents a
missing link here since it does not provide any rationale to justify his rising
leverage thesis at the macroeconomic level (Lavoie and Seccareccia 2001, 84).
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The attempts by post-Keynesian economists to disaggregate the business
cycle along lines suggested by Minsky undeniably reflect a certain analogy with
the Austrian approach. However, whereas Minsky develops the linkage of busi-
ness investment with finance in the microeconomic sphere by extending the
conventional neoclassical theory of the firm, Austrians base their unique macro-
economics on the concept of an inter-temporal structure of production and
disaggregate the macro-economy by according a central role to the capital
structure of the economy in the tradition of Menger (1871 [1994]) and Böhm-
Bawerk (1959).
To the extent both models relate to the same macroeconomic reality, how-
ever, it seems plausible to assume that some scope for integration of both
disaggregation schemes may be found, both theoretically and empirically.
Thus it seems plausible to suppose that the shift towards increased macroeco-
nomic fragility over the course of the boom according to Minsky’s scheme will
not occur “evenly” throughout the economy but rather “differentially” in ways
that reflect the different stages of production according to the Austrian disag-
gregation scheme. This is one area where future research may prove some fertile
cross-fertilization or even partial theoretical integration between both
approaches to be possible.
4.2 Critique of Mainstream Equilibrium Theorizing and the Use
of Equilibrium Concepts
Both Minsky and the Austrians have criticized variants of mainstream equili-
brium theorizing. Austrians are methodologically at odds with neoclassical
equilibrium theory. They eschew mathematical formalism, especially of the
mechanistic type, preferring a historical narrative of events, reflecting their
perception that events form part of dynamic processes that more often than
not are out of equilibrium (Simpson 2013, 135). The traditional Austrian theory of
the cycle has also been characterized as profoundly deterministic: the arrival
situation is a stationary equilibrium determined in a univocal manner on the
basis of real variables (preferences, techniques and initial endowments of
agents) and the ultimate cause of the cycle is purely monetary (bank policy)
(Gloria-Palermo 1999, 74).
However, while Minsky’s rejection of the “crutch” of equilibrium is total and
uncompromising, the Austrian theory retains an equilibrium concept in an
essential way. A tendency towards equilibrium is a key feature of the Austrian
cycle. From the Austrian viewpoint, a proper but limited use of an equilibrium
concept as a benchmark leads to a dynamic disequilibrium theory of a cycle
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(Cochran and Glahe 1992, 1999). Hayek’s early work reflects a subtle tension
between the perceived necessity of stating his case in a theoretically acceptable
fashion, i. e., equilibrium theory, and a sense of that theory’s limitations (Butos
1985). In Minsky’s view, to the contrary, the traditional re-equilibrating price
mechanism is replaced by quantity mechanisms that exert cumulative effects on
one another. After reaching their maximum development, the resulting tenden-
cies wane and reverse. Advanced capitalist economies thus cyclically fluctuate
in a permanent disequilibrium (De Antoni 2010, 466).
4.3 Price-Theoretic Aspects
Both Minsky and the Austrians have made attempts to provide their respective
theories of the business cycle with price-theoretic foundations. The Austrian
theory of the business cycle has a sound basis in price theory. The interest rate is
a price; it is the price that strikes a balance between people’s eagerness to
consume now and their willingness to save for the future (Van den Hauwe
2009a).
Minsky is one of a small group of post-Keynesian economists who have
insisted on the importance of the price-theoretic aspects of Keynes’ work, and
who continued to try to develop this aspect of the Keynesian system. As has
been explained, according to Minsky’s theory there are really two systems of
prices in a capitalist economy – one for current output and the other for capital
assets. When the price level of capital assets is high relative to the price level of
current output, conditions are favorable for investment; when the price level of
capital assets is low relative to the price level of current output, then conditions
are not favorable for investment, and a recession – or a depression – is indicated
(Minsky 1986 [2008]; also Kregel 1992, 87). The fundamental relative price in a
capitalist economy is thus the relation between the price of capital assets and
the price of current output. This two-price model is the analytical tool by which
Minsky integrates his theory of money and finance into his theory of investment.
While Minsky’s approach is thus still framed in terms of “price levels”, the
logic of the Austrian theory is firmly anchored in the notion that the price system
is a communications network. A miscommunication in the form of an interest
rate held below its market or “natural” level by central-bank policy sets the
economy off on a growth path that is inherently unsustainable. In a famous
paper on “The use of knowledge in society” (Hayek 1945) Hayek summarized his
view of the role of prices in market processes. Knowledge is not universally
available. The great economic question is how to make the greatest social use of
knowledge that is not universally available but exists only in dispersed form
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across the entire population. The “market” is a decentralized solution to the
fundamental problem of making use of widely dispersed knowledge. Thus the
prices of resource inputs convey in a highly condensed form just enough
information to make sure that the inputs are appropriately allocated, without
any need for market participants to possess any detailed information about why
certain price changes are occurring. Every market participant knows something,
nobody knows everything. Institutions such as the price system, but also money
and traditional rules of conduct, facilitate the coordination and effective use of
this dispersed knowledge. In analogy with the famous incompleteness theorems
of the mathematician and logician Kurt Gödel, any monocentric, top-down
attempt to solve this coordination problem must necessarily remain incomplete
and is doomed to fail (van den Hauwe 2011b). These insights are no part of
Minsky’s perspective.
4.4 Monetary Aspects
Minsky’s work is best understood as a contribution to the general theory of
money.
In particular his work represents the most significant American contribution
of his generation to the Banking School tradition of monetary thought that sees
money arising as the natural byproduct of business finance (Mehrling 1999, 150).
The Austrian theory of boom and bust, despite its explicit focus on saving,
investment, consumption, and production time, is equally, root and branch, a
monetary theory (Garrison 2001, 52).
4.4.1 Inter-Dependence of Real and Monetary Aspects
Economists commonly distinguish between monetary and non-monetary the-
ories or explanations of the business cycle. Both Minsky’s theory and the
Austrian theory can be characterized as belonging to the monetary approach
to the explanation of business cycles in the sense that Minsky and the Austrians
would agree that any adequate explanation of the business cycle will highlight
both the monetary and the real factors involved.8
8 In contrast money has no role in, e. g., real business cycle theory (RBC). According to the RBC
theory, exogenous fluctuations in the level of total factor productivity make steady reallocations
of the factors of production necessary in order to maintain an efficient economic allocation.
Observed business fluctuations are explained as the efficient outcome of the interaction
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According to Minsky business cycles are both monetary and real phenomena
(2004, xiv). The artificial separation between monetary and real phenomena is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the analysis of the determinants of invest-
ment is necessary for business cycle theory. On the Austrian side, according to
Machlup’s well-known statement, “(t)he fundamental thesis of Hayek’s theory of
the business cycle was that monetary factors cause the cycle but real phenomena
constitute it” (Machlup 1976, 23; also Hayek 1969 [1978]).
4.4.2 The Endogeneity of Money
At the most general level, money endogeneity implies that the supply of money
is not independent of demand. Often, however, the exogeneity-endogeneity
distinction has referred to the ability of the central bank to control the money
supply. Post-Keynesians do not accept money exogeneity, even in the control (or
weak exogeneity) sense. Minsky’s approach to money implies an upward-
sloping money supply curve and thus the acceptance of an endogenously
determined interest rate, in contrast to the “horizontalists” who argue that
interest rates are exogenously set by the central bank. Generally Minsky’s
approach emphasizes uncertainty, liquidity preference, profit-seeking behavior,
and innovations in addition to central bank behavior (also Wray 1992). Post-
Keynesians have in particular emphasized the ability of financial institutions to
economize on reserves and to innovate to escape attempts by the central bank to
use quantity controls. These activities play a central role in Minsky’s FIH for they
contribute to the transition from a robust financial system to a fragile one in
which liquidity has become stretched. Innovations allow an existing quantity of
high-powered money to support greater expenditures. This can be linked to an
upward-sloping velocity function: as interest rates rise, banks will expand credit
in response to profit opportunities. Thus, any given quantity of money, narrowly
defined, could permit more spending as credit is created. Furthermore, innova-
tions can shift the velocity-interest rate function so that velocity might increase
even without rising interest rates.
To recognize the endogeneity of money resurrects the Keynesian concept of
liquidity preference as a central cause of the volatility of macroeconomic
activity. According to Minsky, there exists a functional relation between the
price of a particular or a representative capital or financial asset and the
between agents’ maximizing behavior (Arnold 2002). Real business cycle theory is thus an
example of a non-monetary theory of the business cycle. The theory attributes business cycles
to real or supply shocks, such as changes in technology (Rabin 2004).
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quantity of money. Normally the price of a capital asset is a rising function of
the quantity of money, for as the quantity increases the value of the insurance
in money decreases. As the price of money is always one, this implies that the
price level of income-yielding capital assets increases (Minsky 1986
[2008], 203).
In Minsky’s two-price-level model in the short run current output and
capital-asset prices depend upon different market processes. Whereas wages
and the current costs of producing output, and thus the offer prices of current
output, move sluggishly, the prices of units in the stock of capital assets and,
more directly, the price of equity shares traded on the exchanges can move
rapidly. Thus the relation between the two price levels can change quite quickly:
on the one hand a price level of current output which is in principle sluggish, on
the other a price level of capital assets which is in principle volatile (also Kregel
1992).
Austrians have in general been critical both of liquidity preference theory
and of the monetary theory of the interest rate. Austrian economists question
both the central place of liquidity preference in Keynes’s account of the business
cycle and the legitimacy of the liquidity preference theory itself. According to
Garrison, “(l)iquidity preference, which is sometimes seen as the sine qua non of
Keynesianism, plays a secondary role – in term s of both causation and chron-
ology – in Keynes’s account of the business cycle” (2001, 150). According to
Rothbard, the Keynesian doctrine of liquidity preference suffers from the math-
ematical-economic sin of “mutual determination” (Rothbard 1962 [2004],
785–92). Following Lachmann (1937 [1994]), Rothbard also points out that in
the presence of an organized forward or futures market for securities, speculative
bearishness would indeed cause at least a temporary rise in the rate of interest,
but accompanied by no increase in the demand for cash. He concludes that “any
attempted connection between liquidity preference, or demand for cash, and the
rate of interest, falls to the ground” (1962 [2004], 792).
On the other hand Austrians and Keynesians seem to by and large agree on
the endogeneity of money issue. According to Cochran and Glahe (1999, 75 fn)
“Hayek’s view of the money supply process expressed in his discussion of
endogenous versus exogenous theories is compatible with the Post-Keynesian
theory of money.” Godley and Lavoie (2012, 127) write that “(t)here is a school of
thought that has long been arguing in favour of endogenous money. This line of
thought goes back to the writings of Thomas Tooke and the Banking School, and
has been present in the history of economic thought ever since. It can be
associated with the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell as well as several econo-
mists of the Austrian tradition, such as von Mises and Friedrich Hayek in the
1920s and 1930s.”
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Hayek had criticized von Mises’s theory, however, as being exogenous.
The von Mises cycle starts with a monetary injection initiated by the banking
system; the market rate is decreased below the natural rate as banks extend
additional loans. The cycle results from an active intervention into the market
process. In the Hayekian model the cycle may start in this manner, but it may
also start if banks fail to increase the market rate when the natural rate
increases, in particular when investment demand increases and banks are
confronted with an increased demand for funds (Hayek 1933 [2008], 76; also
Cochran and Glahe 1999, 75).
4.4.3 The Non-Neutrality of Money
Minsky points out that the dominant microeconomic paradigm is an equilibrium
construct in which initial endowments of agents, preference systems, and produc-
tion relations, along with maximizing behavior, determine relative prices, out-
puts, and an allocation of outputs to agents. Money and financial interrelations
are not relevant to the determination of these equilibrium variables. An implica-
tion of these constructs in the dominant microeconomics and the core of the
dominant macroeconomics is that money and finance are neutral. In these
dominant models money is a veil (Minsky 1993, 77). Minsky disputes
Friedman’s proposition that, although money and other institutions complicate
the analysis, all the important characteristics of a modern capitalist economy are
supposed to be contained in the simple model of the barter economy (Minsky
1986 [2008], 129).
In the real financial capitalist world money is the key institution. It is
endogenous, created during normal economic processes. Minsky emphasizes
that, most importantly, money is created in the process of financing positions
in assets. Banks increase the money supply whenever they share the belief of the
borrower that positions in assets or financed activity will generate sufficient
cash flows. If the future turns out to be worse than expected, it may be
impossible to meet commitments. So money and nominal financial commit-
ments matter. The conventional economic paradigm is thus not the only way
economic interrelations can be modeled. Every capitalist economy can be
described in terms of sets of interrelated balance sheets. At every reading of
the balance sheet the financial instruments can be interpreted as generating two
sets of time series: the liabilities generate payment commitments, and the assets
generate expected cash receipts. Balance sheets relations link yesterdays,
todays, and tomorrows: payment commitments entered in the past lead to
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cash payments that need to be executed now as well as future cash payments,
even as liabilities are taken on now that commit future cash flows. In this
structure the real and the financial dimensions of the economy are not sepa-
rated: there is no so-called real economy whose behavior can be studied by
abstracting from financial considerations. This system, linking yesterdays,
todays, and tomorrows both financially and in terms of the demand for and
supply of goods and services, is not a well-behaved linear system. Furthermore,
the presumption that this system has an equilibrium cannot be sustained. This
modeling of the economy leads to a process in time that generates a path that
can fly off to deep depressions and open-ended inflations, even in the absence
of exogenous shocks or strange displacements. In this model obviously money is
never neutral (Minsky 1993, 78).
Austrian insights concerning the non-neutrality of money derive from an
entirely different strand of literature. Austrians are inclined to emphasize
“Cantillon effects” of changes in the money supply, so called after Richard
Cantillon (1755 [2001]) When new money enters the economy, perhaps as the
result of gold discoveries under a gold standard, perhaps as the result of credit
expansion under a fiduciary system, the new money does not penetrate all
sectors of the economy at a uniform pace. The process does not work uniformly.
Changes in the money supply distort, at least transitionally, the pattern of
relative prices and incomes and consequently distort the patterns of resource
allocation and production. Such distortions form one reason why Austrians take
a micro approach to theory and disdain theorizing in terms of aggregates and
averages (also Yeager 1988, 95).
The Austrian viewpoint differs not only from the Post-Keynesian position
but also from that of the monetarists who held the view, as the classics had
done, that money is both neutral and super-neutral in the long run (Smithin
2013, 47). As regards the impact of monetary stimulus, Austrians in this respect
hold the position that money is non-neutral even in the long run (Ravier 2013).
In a recent contribution Bilo and Wagner (2015) argue, however, that it is not
necessary to reject the classical equilibrium condition; they set forth an alter-
native though not contradictory analytical framework whereby monetary pro-
cesses can in the long run exert real economic effects. By redistributing
resources, monetary processes influence the mix of entrepreneurial experi-
ments that are injected into society. The two frameworks are non-commensur-
able rather than inconsistent. Whereas long-run non-neutrality is a feature of
movement through time – it is a historical fact – long-run neutrality is a
necessary condition for systemic equilibrium outside of time – it is an analy-
tical artifact.
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4.5 Capital-theoretic Aspects and the Role of the Credit
Expansion Process
In Minsky’s theoretical construction considerations relating to time and capital
clearly play an important and essential role. He concluded his Stabilizing an
Unstable Economy with the consideration that “(t)he essential Keynesian result,
that capitalism is flawed mainly because it handles capital poorly, nowhere
enlightens current policy actions (…)” and that “Keynes recognized the flaws in
capitalism because he, more than his predecessors, contemporaries, and suc-
cessors, understood the financial and time-related aspects of a capitalism that
uses capital” (Minsky 1986 [2008], 369).
In the Austrian theory the critical time element manifests itself as an inter-
temporal capital structure or structure of production which is unique to Austrian
macroeconomics: as envisioned early on by Menger (1871 [1994], 80–87) the
economy’s production process is disaggregated into a number of temporally
sequenced stages of production in order to allow for the output of the invest-
ment-goods sector and of the consumer-goods sector to move relative to one
another and even to allow for differential movements within the investment-
goods sector. Replacing the single investment aggregate with temporally
sequenced stages that make up the economy’s capital structure is what provides
a basis for a substantive distinction between sustainable growth and unsustain-
able boom.
In Minsky’s construction the essential feature of capitalism – capital accu-
mulation – is intimately tied to money creation. Money cannot be neutral
precisely because its creation is “tied up with the process of creating and
controlling capital assets…” (Minsky 1986 [2008], 223). And the quantity of
money cannot be exogenously determined as it is created as a result of private
profit-seeking behavior. Money is created in the process of financing investment
and forces the surplus which is necessary to allow capital formation. More
fundamentally, credit creation is the means by which society ensures that the
workers cannot purchase the total product. Credit creation gives purchasing
power to entrepreneurs so they may finance capital accumulation. As Minsky
argues, the markup in the consumption goods industry guarantees that workers
in the investment goods industry can obtain consumption goods, while spend-
ing on investment goods generates a surplus over labor income (Minsky 1986
[2008], Chapter 7). The money thus created fulfills two other important func-
tions: it serves as a medium of exchange, and it can be held as insurance against
an uncertain future.
Summarizing, in Minsky’s construction three elements seem essentially
linked: taking positions in assets; accepting liability structures; and money
20 L. Van Den Hauwe
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
creation. It is important to note how this analysis differs essentially from the
Austrian analysis. Money and credit created in the process of capital formation is
what in the Austrian theory is designated as credit expansion. However, the
Austrian analysis is built around the fundamental conceptual and theoretical
distinction between capital accumulation, in the sense of making possible
sustainable growth which presupposes and derives from genuine saving, and
unsustainable growth, that is, boom and bust, which derive from credit expan-
sion and which involve forced saving. This conceptual distinction is absent from
Minsky’s theoretical framework.9
Actually Minsky seems to be arguing that capital accumulation necessarily,
or at least usually and regularly, involves money and credit creation and thus
what in the Austrian framework is characterized as forced saving. Austrians
obviously object to the proposition that capital accumulation as the essential
feature of capitalist economies is essentially and necessarily tied to credit
expansion and money creation involving forced saving. Capital formation
requires genuine saving. In this context Mises made the useful distinction
between commodity credit and circulation credit. Commodity credit cannot be
expanded (Mises 1949 [1966], 433–4). As Mises argues, the boom actually gen-
erates capital consumption. As he wrote: “…it is very questionable whether
forced saving can ever achieve more than to counterbalance a part of the capital
consumption generated by the boom” (1949 [1966], 575–6). Moreover Austrian
theory emphasizes aspects of capital that are neglected by other macroeconomic
approaches, allowing for deeper insight and added explanatory power. Capital
goods are non-homogenous, non-permanent, and either specific or non-specific;
in particular capital goods are complementary (Hayek 1937 [1939]; Lachmann
1956 [1978]; also Cochran and Glahe 1999, Chapter 8).
Summarizing, Minsky’s analysis and the Austrian analysis of the business
cycle are superficially similar in that they both derive from an attempt to
integrate monetary theory with capital theory. The introduction of a theory of
heterogeneous capital and of a disaggregated intertemporal capital structure
into the theoretical analysis of business cycle phenomena is unique to the
Austrian approach, however. From the Austrian viewpoint, Minsky’s analysis,
by neglecting the crucial distinction between capital investment backed by (an
increase in) genuine saving and capital investment financed by money creation
and credit expansion, ultimately misidentifies the fundamental cause of finan-
cial instability.
9 It will be remembered here that early on Austrians had been confronted with Sraffa’s critique
of this very distinction. See Sraffa (1932 [1995]).
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4.6 Uncertainty, Animal Spirits, and the Role
of the Institutional Context
Minsky acknowledges the role and importance of Knightian uncertainty in
explaining economic instability. According to Minsky the essential difference
between Keynesian and both classical and neoclassical economics is the impor-
tance attached to uncertainty (Minsky 1982, 128). Minsky agrees with Keynes that
the future is essentially unknowable and beliefs regarding the future are highly
subjective, and that in particular in abnormal times the economy will be driven
up and down by baseless sentiments and waves of investor sentiment.
Austrians generally recognize that whereas risk analysis, whether objective
or subjective, is essentially a weighting of possibilities already known, genuine
uncertainty allows for the unpredictable growth of these possibilities and thus
for “gaps” in agents’ probability distributions. The source of uncertainty is
endogenous in a world in real time (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1996, 64 ff. and
Ch. 5). At first sight the views of post-Keynesians and Austrians about the
meaning and role of uncertainty thus seem to converge. At a fundamental
theoretical level, Ludwig von Mises’s views on probability were already closer
to the spirit of Keynes’s philosophy of probability than to the frequency inter-
pretation of his brother Richard von Mises (Van den Hauwe 2011a).
Both post-Keynesians and Austrians also stress the role and nature of
institutions, in particular of bank and financial institutions, in economic
processes. Minsky highlights the significance of banks and financial institu-
tions as profit-seeking agents which react to perceived profit opportunities with
financial innovations (and, so, stresses the endogeneity of the “effective”
quantity of money and of the rate of interest) (Bellofiore and Ferri 2001b, 21).
From the beginning, Minsky extended profit-seeking behavior from entrepre-
neurs and businessmen to bankers and financiers. On the Austrian side,
Horwitz contends that “(w)hat the textbook model of the Classical economists
misses is how money and the banking system work to ensure the valid insight
behind Say’s Law (…)” (Horwitz 2000, 86) and that “Austrian analyses of
competition as a discovery process, the Hayekian emphasis on prices and
knowledge, and the focus on the central role played by institutions, have all
affected the way economists outside the Austrian tradition are doing their
work” (2000, 237).
As is explained further, however, a complete disagreement prevails between
the two approaches as to the type or kind of institutions that would actually
eliminate or at least mitigate the business cycle and macroeconomic instability.
Whereas Austrians have made a case in favor of complete freedom of choice in
currency and of a system of free banking, and have thus advocated the abolition
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of central banks, Minsky believes that Big Players can effectively stabilize the
economy and has argued in favor of interventionism by in particular Big Bank
and Big Government. Moreover this divergence can be explained by the fact that
Minsky and the Austrians conceptualize in entirely different ways the relation-
ship between the institutional context or environment and expectations and thus
also between institutions and “the state of confidence” and fluctuations therein.
In fact diametrically opposed positions are taken as regards the role of particular
institutional contexts in generating (variations in) real-world uncertainty and the
state of confidence.
There is a sense in which uncertainty is a universal aspect of human action
to the extent that it is essentially inherent in action itself (Mises 1949 [1966],
105). However, it is conceivable and in fact true that at least part of the
uncertainties economic actors in the economy face do not have this necessary
and universal character but can be related to the particular institutional context
that is present. A certain level of uncertainty is then of a contingent character in
the sense that it could conceivably be removed or reduced through institutional
reform. Considerations of this sort apparently underlie Keynes’s well-known
proposal for “a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment” (Keynes
1936 [1997], 378). At the end of John Maynard Keynes (Minsky 1975 [2008])
Minsky reminds us that Keynes “believed that both measures to raise the con-
sumption function and the socialization of investment were necessary to sustain
full employment and were desirable as social goals” (1975 [2008], 157). The
decentralized decision making, which is the heart and soul of the market
economy, adds a layer of uncertainty which restricts the economy to a level of
performance that Keynes finds wanting and which therefore must be eliminated
or at least severely restricted through centralization which alone can pave the
way toward full employment. In this sense the central message of the General
Theory too derives from comparative institutions analysis and not from the
analysis of cyclical fluctuations (also Garrison 2001, 180 ff).
Contemporary research in behavioral macroeconomics identifies animal
spirits, defined by Keynes (1936 [1997]) as waves of optimism and pessimism
of investors that have a self-fulfilling property, as an important independent and
essentially unpredictable factor driving the movements of investment and out-
put and shaping business cycle fluctuations. These waves of optimism and
pessimism can be understood to be learning mechanisms of agents who do
not fully understand the underlying model but are continually searching for
the truth (De Grauwe 2012). As is explained further, the theory of Big Players
goes beyond this way of modeling the role of uncertainty by recognizing that an
appeal to swings in investor optimism/pessimism or “animal spirits” is not
wrong, but that it merely pushes the question back one stage: What explains
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the swings in investor enthusiasm? (White 2015, 110) From this perspective the
explanatory strength of confidence theories – such as Minsky’s--is weak.
Austrians have acknowledged the link between institutional context and the
nature of expectations but their conclusions are virtually opposite to those of
post-Keynesians. Big Players (Koppl 2002; Prychitko 2010) and the related con-
cept of regime uncertainty (Higgs 1997) – or uncertainty about the rules of the
game – both artificially reduce the state of confidence by corrupting the expec-
tations of financial intermediaries and businesses in the real economy. As long
as Big Player influence and regime uncertainty persist confidence will be low;
both have the potential to create a permanent slump. The low state of con-
fidence they create is not self-correcting (Koppl 2014).
The process by which individual knowledge is changed is influenced by
institutions and in this sense expectations depend on institutions (Koppl 2002).
Expectations will be more prescient in some institutional environments than in
others. Adopting a Hayekian evolutionary stance, Butos and Koppl (1993) draw
our attention to the filtering conditions of stability and atomicity. The failure of
either condition creates a loose “system constraint” and thus a loose link
between environment and expectations. If the market includes actors who are
more or less immune from the competitive pressures of profit and loss, then the
natural selection of rules will be inoperative with regard to these actors and the
system constraint facing them will be loose. In such cases the privileged actors
are free to act idiosyncratically (Butos and Koppl 1993, 321). Lack of stability or
atomism produces ignorance and uncertainty. In the presence of Big Players
economic expectations tend to become less reliable. A stable economic environ-
ment with atomistic competition, to the contrary, tends to produce rational
outcomes and prescient expectations. Minsky is an advocate par excellence of
an eminent role for Big Players in the economy.10
Summarizing, Austrians point out that Keynesian policies, and in particular
the interventions of Big Players, tend to create and enhance the irregular ups
and downs that Keynes attributed to modern capitalism as such. In this sense,
Keynesian policies tend to create a Keynesian economy. This conclusion is also
compatible with long-established conclusions of the so-called Socialist
Calculation Debate (Huerta de Soto 2010). In the domain of money and banking
Austrians have generally advocated the abolition of central banks and a move
10 A Big Player has three defining characteristics. The player is big in the sense that its actions
influence the market under study; it is insensitive to the discipline of profit and loss; and it is
arbitrary in the sense that its actions are based on discretion rather than any set of rules (Koppl
2014, 97). An activist central bank is a representative Big Player – it can be large, it is protected
and its actions will be unpredictable.
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towards free (or decentralized) banking, despite some ongoing debates about
how exactly free banking is to be defined.
5 Interpreting Recent Historical Evidence: Minsky
and the Austrians on the Global Financial Crisis
A case can be made that the global financial crisis was foreseeable and avoid-
able. It did not “just happen” (FCIC 2011).11 Tymoigne and Wray (2014) argue
that Minsky’s framework helps us to understand what has happened over the
past half century instead of merely explaining the recent boom and crisis. They
explain how capitalism in developed countries progressively moved from a more
stable form of capitalism that Minsky called Managerial Capitalism to a more
unstable form called Money Manager Capitalism. The 1980s S&L crisis put the
final nail in the coffin of Managerial Capitalism as the system moved to Money
Manager Capitalism (MMC). MMC is characterized by the rise of a predatory
state, the disengagement of the government, the return of a pro-market mental-
ity, and a growing role of financial markets in determining economic outcomes.
Two main factors contributed to the Great Recession: pro-market policies and
the decline in underwriting standards on loans and securities. Both contributed
to the growth of indebtedness in the private sector and to the change in the
quality of this indebtedness for the worse. This change in quality manifested
itself primarily through a move toward collateral-based lending, i. e., lending
based on growing asset prices instead of income. These authors conclude that
the two main lessons we should have learned (but probably did not) from the
GFC is that the Great Recession did not happen by accident and that the GFC was
not a “liquidity crisis” but a solvency crisis.
While Austrians might agree with certain descriptive elements contained in
this narrative, they would certainly sharply dispute the thesis that the Great
Recession was a consequence of pro-market policies. Indeed the Austrians, in
general agreement with their pro-free-market philosophy, have in particular
emphasized and highlighted (1) the role of the Fed in engineering excessive
11 Post-Keynesians working in the tradition of Minsky as well as Austrians have actively
participated in debates relating to the historical context provided by the GFC and subsequent
Great Recession. Several collections of papers have been published. Reference can be made to,
among others, Dejuán, Febrero, and Marcuzzo (2011), Kates (2010, 2011), and some of the papers
in Page West III and Whaples (2013). Mention should also be made of Beckworth (2012); Booth
(2009); Friedman (2011); Hein, Detzer, and Dodig (2015); Wolfson and Epstein (2013). Howden
(2011) offers a European perspective.
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money and credit creation (Fillieule 2010, 179–80; Huerta de Soto 2011; Posner
2011; Salin 2010; Taylor 2009, 2011) and (2) the perverse incentive effects of
disastrous regulations (Friedman and Kraus 2011).
Concerning the first point, experimental evidence seems to provide some
corroboration regarding the role of liquidity in asset bubbles. Gjerstad and Smith
(2014) do not explicitly refer to the Austrian theory of the business cycle but
several of their findings seem compatible with an interpretation in such terms.
Experimental research demonstrates the key proposition that not all markets are
created equal: whereas commodity-flow markets tend to converge quickly,
prices in asset-trading markets typically deviate substantially from those pre-
dicted by the rational expectations market model (also Smith, Suchanek, and
Williams 1988). People in laboratory asset-market experiments, as well as their
“sophisticated” counterparts in economies today, become entangled in self-
sustaining expectations of escalating prices. One of the important parallels in
behavior between experimental price bubbles and those in the housing market is
that, as in the laboratory, money matters: the availability and aggressive market-
ing of mortgage credit supported the housing bubble until credit started to be
withdrawn (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988, 269–70). The observation that
prices can be sustained longer and more vigorously if momentum investors have
more liquidity is consistent with experimental findings. More money makes for
bigger bubbles. A significant and sustained change in monetary policy begin-
ning in 2001 is potentially implicated in strengthening and imparting longer life
to the mortgage market growth that fueled the housing price bubble (Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams 1988, 166–7).
Concerning the second point, the historical situation that has resulted from
regulatory issues, financial innovation and their interaction is in fact extremely
complex. Kregel (2008) analyzes the cushion of safety in asset securitization and
in collateralized subprime mortgage obligations, also considering the role of
“special purpose entities” (SPEs), and concludes that the crisis was not the
result of a traditional endogenous Minsky process in which narrowing margins
of safety lead to fragility, but rather a structural result of how creditworthiness is
assessed in the new “originate and distribute” financial system sanctioned by
the modernization of financial services.
On the one hand a tendency has prevailed to demonize structured finance
and to consider its use as a scapegoat and as the culprit of problems in the
financial markets (see e. g. Greenberger 2013). On the other hand a closer
examination of the role of incentives resulting from a particular set of regula-
tions suggests that while structured finance itself is not bad, it was certainly
possible to use it badly (Murphy 2009, 221). From this perspective structured
finance is merely a tool, an instrument that can make credit cheaper by
26 L. Van Den Hauwe
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
allocating it more efficiently. Rather it is the role of incentives that encouraged
banks to move risk to insurance companies, ABCP investors, and other investors
that caused the problems.
The role of incentives is explicitly considered in Friedman and Kraus (2011);
these authors embrace the regulatory failure thesis. In particular they debunk
various elements of the conventional wisdom about what caused the financial
crisis and argue that the crisis was a regulatory failure in which the prime culprit
was the set of regulations governing banks’ capital levels known as the Basel
rules. Theirs is an “incentives story” but it is not a moral-hazard story. They
stress the role of radical ignorance on all sides. The triple-A ratings on MBS were
conferred by three bond-rating corporations that had been protected from com-
petition by Securities and Exchange Commission regulation dating back to 1975.
Not only bankers but investors of all kinds were either unaware that these three
corporations were protected, or they were unaware of the implications of this
protection for the accuracy of their ratings. This lack of awareness was appar-
ently shared by the banking regulators, who had incorporated the three compa-
nies’ ratings into the Recourse Rule and Basel II. The financial crisis was
transmitted into the nonfinancial or “real” economy through a lending contrac-
tion that began in mid-2007, as banks were required to “mark to market” their
holdings of mortgage-backed securities in line with market fears about the value
of these securities, due to rising rates of subprime mortgage delinquencies.12
Both sides have thus produced a number of analyses but no comprehensive
synthesis seems to be available at this time. This is another area where some
scope for cross-fertilization between both approaches may exist and will possi-
bly be exploited by future research.
6 Policy Implications
To Keynes’s argument that the two outstanding faults of capitalism are its
arbitrary and inequitable distribution of income and unemployment – and for
which he proposed an employer-of-last-resort (ELR) policy as a solution –
Minsky added a third: a financially complex capitalist economy will tend to
generate instability (Wray 2013).
12 On the role of bank-capital regulations (or so-called “Basel accords”) see in particular also
V. V. Acharya and M. Richardson (2011) and J. Jablecki and M. Machaj (2001). Also, but in a
different sense, Sinn (2010). On the controversial role of credit-default swaps in the crisis, see
P. J. Wallison (2011). On the role of the credit-rating agencies, see L. J. White (2011). Minsky
(1987) was a prescient piece about securitization.
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Minsky’s reform proposals are multifaceted and somewhat eclectic. In the
financial sphere he was in favor of smaller banks; in order to support decen-
tralization and a return to more relationship-oriented banking he proposed the
creation of a system of community development banks. He also favored mea-
sures to improve underwriting, direct credit controls, enhancing bank evalua-
tions through greater use of the discount window, and macroprudential
regulation. He rejected the old mainstream view that the central bank can
constrain bank activity by rationing reserves. He wanted to favor small firms
over big corporations and advocated elimination of the corporate profits tax. As
a student at Chicago he had been exposed to the 100 percent money proposal
and he was favorably disposed toward these ideas.
His views about the role of Big Players in the economy remain most incon-
gruent with the Austrian vision, however.
Minsky’s theory of money supply endogeneity leads clearly to the con-
clusion that monetary growth policies are not effective at controlling finan-
cial market forces and are particularly inefficient in controlling the thrust
toward speculative finance. Minsky argues that two other policy instru-
ments--federal government deficit spending and lender-of-last-resort inter-
ventions by the Federal Reserve--are extremely effective, if not at achieving
full employment, at least in limiting the downside variability of incomes and
liquidity during economic downturns, particularly in periods of incipient
financial crisis.
It is important to see that in Minsky’s “two price” view of the world, two
stabilizers are indeed needed: Big Government (BG) and a Big Bank (BB). Drawing
from Kalecki’s well-known accounting identity that, in a closed economy, profits
equal investment plus the government deficit, Minsky argues that the effect of
deficit spending during a downturn is to establish a floor for profits (Minsky 1986
[2008], 1982). Big Government spending can thus partially offset the fall in profit
flows which results from a fall-off in investment or overoptimistic expectations, and
in this way, provides support for consumption goods prices. But it cannot directly
support the fall in the value of a bank’s assets which results from a fall in capital
goods prices. This is why Big Government, by itself, is not enough to counter
instability. A Big Bank must come in to stabilize the prices of capital assets by
counteracting the liquidity shortages of distressed financial firms. Because of the
powerful effects of these policies, Minsky believed firmly that another large-scale
debt deflation and depression, such as occurred in the 1930s, could, at least in
principle, be prevented from happening again.
In this scenario, deficit spending and lender-of-last-resort interventions, and
the potential costs associated with risky financial practices are, to a considerable
extent, socialized since government rather than firms absorbs these costs. The
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socialization of financial market risk promotes fragility since, as Minsky
acknowledged, once borrowers and lenders recognize that the downside
instability of profits has decreased, there will be an increase in the willingness
and ability of business and bankers to debt finance. If the cash flows to validate
debt are virtually guaranteed by the profit implications of big government, then
debt-financing of positions in capital assets is encouraged (Minsky 1986 [2008]).
From the Austrian viewpoint, cyclical and financial instability are not
inherent in purely capitalist free-market economies but are essentially phenom-
ena of mixed economies (Ikeda 1997). Austrians can question the adequacy of
Minsky’s identification of the relevant institutional context. The instability of
capitalist economies that has been observed in history is actually and invariably
the instability of a mixed system. At the theoretical level this circumstance may
still seem to leave open the answer to the question of whether financial instabil-
ity is conceivably inherent in free market economies or whether it is actually a
consequence of government intervention. Austrians generally argue, however,
that the business cycle is actually generated by public authorities’ interventions
in market processes (Hayek 1979). In particular the observed instability in
current-day banking regimes is not prima facie evidence for the hypothesis
that a banking system makes itself fragile. Current-day systems are characterized
by central banks and other government agencies with power to disrupt the
system (White 2015, 110).
Austrians therefore have generally deplored the movement towards com-
mand and control which they believe is a mistake that threatens the wealth and
welfare of the people. Instead we need to restore the rule of law and economic
liberalism (Koppl 2014). In other words, in order to significantly reduce regime
uncertainty and Big Player influence we need to take the “constitutional turn”.13
Such an economic constitution would have to comprise: (a) Fiscal discipline
since when government revenues are big enough, uncertainty over the tax bill
becomes destructive regime uncertainty and a drag on output14; (b) A monetary
constitution since only if current austerity is combined with sensible reforms to
create a sound monetary constitution will the likelihood of future debt crises be
reduced15; (c) A regulatory constitution since without real regulatory reform
there is little hope to escape crony capitalism that increases the role of Big
Players; we should regulate the regulators in the same way that markets regulate
private firms (Koppl 2014).
13 On constitutional economics in general, see Van den Hauwe (2005).
14 For a concrete proposal, see Buchanan and Wagner (1977 [2000]).
15 On reforming government’s role in the monetary system, see White, Vanberg, and Köhler
(2015). See also T. Polleit and M. von Prollius (2010) and the papers in P. Altmiks (Hg.) (2010).
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As regards the monetary dimension, in the context of a central banking
regime, Selgin (1997) has advocated the productivity norm as the alternative to
zero (or positive) inflation.16 Huerta de Soto (2012, 736) goes beyond a proposal
for an alternative monetary rule for central bank behavior and argues that in
order to establish a truly stable financial and monetary system for the twenty-
first century, a system which protects our economies as far as possible from
crisis and recessions, the following will be necessary: (1) complete freedom of
choice in currency; (2) a system of free banking, and the abolition of the central
bank; and most importantly, (3) obligatory observance of traditional legal rules
and principles by all agents involved in the free banking system, particularly the
important principle according to which no one may enjoy the privilege of
loaning something entrusted to him on demand deposit. In short it is necessary
to maintain at all times a banking system which includes a 100-percent reserve
requirement. Huerta de Soto’s definition of free banking is not shared, however,
by authors who advocate a fractional-reserve free banking system as an alter-
native to central banking (Selgin 1988). Although the proposal for fractional-
reserve free banking is fraught with conceptual problems (Van den Hauwe
2009b), the debate between the two factions can be expected to go on.
7 Conclusions
Although Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes’s macroeconomics and essential
message clashes with authoritative alternative interpretations, it has become
increasingly influential in the years following the GFC and further research
along the lines suggested by Minsky can be expected to be forthcoming in
coming years. Some of the analogies and/or similarities of his theoretical ana-
lysis with the analysis provided by the Austrian School suggest a more than
merely superficial affinity between both theoretical approaches and some scope
for cross-fertilization between or even partial theoretical integration of both
research traditions can be found that may be further evidenced by forthcoming
work relating to business cycle theory and to the role of financial innovation and
regulation. Nevertheless, both in terms of fundamental causality and in terms of
16 Under a productivity norm, changes in velocity would be prevented (as under zero inflation)
from influencing the price level through offsetting adjustments in the supply of money. But
adverse “supply shocks” like wars and harvest failures would be allowed to manifest them-
selves in higher output prices, while permanent improvements in productivity would be allowed
to lower prices permanently (Selgin 1997, 10).
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policy conclusions and prescriptions, both approaches remain incompatible at a
fundamental level and difficult if not impossible to reconcile.
Much of the disagreement on policy issues between post-Keynesians and
Austrians hinges on the answer to the underlying question of whether the
actions and interventions of Big Players in mixed economies are stabilizing or
destabilizing. Post-Keynesians believe they can and, if conducted appropriately,
often will indeed be stabilizing; Austrians to the contrary believe that mostly
they will tend to be destabilizing. Minsky’s policy conclusions manifest a lack of
familiarity with the conclusions of the Austrian analysis of the problems of
central planning by Big Players such as Big Bank and Big Government.
Even if the two theoretical frameworks do not directly contradict each other
since they are actually non-commensurable, the Austro-Wicksellian paradigm
arguably provides superior insights that can complement and correct Minskyan
analyses of the historical experience of the GFC and Great Recession.
References
Acharya, V. V., and M. Richardson. 2011. “How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial
Sector”, in: Friedman. 2011: Chapter 7, 183–99.
Altmiks, P., Hg. 2010. Im Schatten Der Finanzkrise—Muss Das Staatliche Zentralbankwesen
Abgeschafft Werden?. München: Olzog Verlag.
Arnold, L. G. 2002. Business Cycle Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Assenza, T., D. Delli Gatti, and M. Gallegati. 2010. “Financial Instability and Agents’
Heterogeneity: A Post Minskyan Research Agenda”, in: Papadimitriou D.B. and Wray L.R.
2010: 182–205.
Backhaus, J. 2005. The Elgar Companion to Law End Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Backhouse, R. E. 2014. “Hayek and Keynes”, in: R. Garrison and N. Barry. 2014: 94–115.
Beckworth, D. 2012. Boom and Bust Banking—the Causes and Cures of the Great Recession.
Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute.
Bellofiore, R., and P. Ferri. 2001a. Financial Keynesianism and Market Instability—the Economic
Legacy of Hyman Minsky. Volume I. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Bellofiore, R., and P. Ferri. 2001b. “Introduction: ‘Things Fall Apart, the Centre Cannot Hold’”,
in: Bellofiore and Ferri. 2001a: 1–29 and in: Bellofiore and Ferri. 2001c: 1–29.
Bellofiore, R., and P. Ferri. 2001c. Financial Fragility and Investment in the Capitalist Economy—
the Economic Legacy of Hyman Minsky. Volume II. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Bhattacharya, S., C. A. E. Goodhart, D. Tsomocos, and A. Vardoulakis. 2011. “Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle”, LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series,
Special paper 202.
Bilo, S., and R. E. Wagner. 2015. “Neutral Money: Historical Fact or Analytical Artifact?”. Review
of Austrian Economics 28:139–50.
Blanchard, O., A. Amighini, and F. Giavazzi. 2010. Macroeconomics—a European Perspective.
Essex: Pearson.
Bohm-Bawerk, Ev. on. 1959. Capital and Interest. South Holland, IL: Libertarian Press.
Understanding Financial Instability 31
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
Booth, P., ed. 2009. Verdict on the Crash: Causes and Policy Implications. London: The Institute
of Economic Affairs.
Buchanan, J. M., and R. E. Wagner. 1977 [2000]. Demovracy in Deficit—the Political Legacy of
Lord Keynes. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Butos, W. N. 1985. “Hayek and General Equilibrium Analysis.” Southern Economic Journal
52 (2):332–43.
Butos, W. N., and R. Koppl. 1993. “Hayekian Expectations: Theory and Empirical Expectations.”
Constitutional Political Economy 4 (3):303–29.
Cachanosky, N., and A. W. Salter 2013. “The View from Vienna: An Analysis of the Renewed
Interest in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the Business Cycle.” Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2363560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2363560
Caldwell, B. 1995. Contra Keynes and Cambridge, the Collected Works of F.A. Hayek Volume 9.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Cantillon, R. 1755 [2001]. Essay on the Nature of Commerce in General. London: Transaction
Publishers.
Cochran, J. P., and F. R. Glahe. 1992. “The Use and Abuse of Equilibrium in Business Cycle
Theory—a Praxeological Approach.” Cultural Dynamics 5:356–70.
Cochran, J. P., and F. R. Glahe. 1999. The Hayek-Keynes Debate—Lessons for Current Business
Cycle Research. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Colander, D., M. Goldberg, A. Haas, K. Juselius, A. Kirman, T. Lux, and B. Sloth. 2011. “The
Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of the Economics Profession”, in: J. Friedman
2011: Chapter 12, 262–78.
D’Apice, V., and G. Ferri. 2010. Financial Instability. New York: Palgrave.
De Antoni, E. 2010. “Minsly’s ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’: The Not-Too-Keynesian
Optimism of a Financial Cassandra”, in: Zambelli. 2010: 462–84.
De Grauwe, P. 2012. Lectures in Behavioral Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Dejuán, Ó., E. Febrero, and M. C. Marcuzzo. 2011. The First Great Recession of the 21st Century.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Detzer, D., and H. Herr 2015. “Theories of Financial Crises as Cumulative Processes”, in: Hein
et al. 2015, Chapter 3: 115–61.
Eggertsson, G. B., and P. Krugman. 2012. “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-
Minsky-Koo Approach.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (3):1469–513.
Fazzari, S., and D. B. Papadimitriou, eds. 1992. Financial Conditions and Macroeconomic
Performance. New York: Sharpe.
Fillieule, R. 2010. L’école Autrichienne D’économie—Une Autre Hétérodoxie. France: Septentrion.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2011. Final Report of the National Commission on the
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crises in the United States. New York: PublicAffairs.
Fisher, I. Oct. 1933. “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions.” Econometrica 1:337–57.
Flanders, J. 2015. “It’s Not a Minsky Moment, It’s a Minsky Era, or: Inevitable Instability”. Econ
Journal Watch 12 (1):84–105.
Friedman J., ed. 2011. What Caused the Financial Crisis?. Oxford: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Friedman, J., and W. Kraus. 2011. Engineering the Financial Crisis—Systemic Risk and the Failure
of Regulation. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Garrison, R. W. 1978. “Austrian Macroeconomics: A Diagrammatical Exposition”, in: Spadaro L.M.
(ed.). 1978.
32 L. Van Den Hauwe
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
Garrison, R. W. 1992. “Is Milton Friedman a Keynesian?”, in: Skousen. 1992: 131–47.
Garrison, R. W. 2001. Time and Money—the Macroeconomics of Capital Structure. London:
Routledge.
Garrison, R. W. 2005. “The Austrian School”, in: Snowdon B. and Vane H.R. 2005: 474–516.
Garrison, R. W., and N. Barry. 2014. Elgar Companion to Hayekian Economics. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Gjerstad, S. D., and V. L. Smith. 2014. Rethinking Housing Bubbles—the Role of Household and
Bank Balance Sheets in Modeling Economic Cycles. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gloria-Palermo, S. 1999. The Evolution of Austrian Economics. London: Routledge.
Godley, W., and M. Lavoie. 2012. Monetary Economics—an Integrated Approach to Credit,
Money, Income, Production and Wealth. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goodspeed, T. B. 2012. Rethinking the Keynesian Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gordon, R. J. 2012. Macroeconomics. New York: Pearson.
Greenberger, M. 2013. “Derivatives in the Crisis and Financial Reform”, Chapter 23 in: Wolfson
and Epstein. 2013: 467–90.
Hayek, F. A. 1931–2. “Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M. Keynes”, in: Caldwell.
1995: 121–46 and 174–97.
Hayek, F. A. 1933 [2008]. Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, in: Salerno J. T.. Prices and
Production and Other Works F. A. Hayek On Money, the Business Cycle, and the Gold
Standard. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Hayek, F. A. 1937 [1939]. “Investment that Raises the Demand for Capital”, in: Hayek. 1939:
73–82.
Hayek, F. A. 1939. Profits, Interest and Investment. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35 (4):519–30,
reprinted in: Hayek F.A. 1948 [1980]: 77–91.
Hayek, F. A. 1948 [1980]. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Hayek, F. A. 1969 [1978]. “Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect”, in: Hayek. 1978: 165–78.
Hayek, F. A. 1978. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hayek, F. A. 1979. Unemployment and Monetary Policy—Government as Generator of the
“Business Cycle.” Cato Paper N° 3. San Francisco, CA: Cato Institute.
Hein, E., D. Detzer, and N. Dodig, eds. 2015. The Demise of Finance-Dominated Capitalism—
Explaining the Financial and Economic Crises. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Higgs, R. 1997. “Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted so Long and Why
Prosperity Resumed After the War”. Independent Review I (4):561–90.
Horwitz, S. 2000. Microfoundations and Macroeconomics—an Austrian Perspective. London:
Routledge.
Howden, D. 2011. Institutions in Crisis—European Perspectives on the Recession. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Huerta de Soto, J. 2010. Socialism, Economic Calculation and Entrepreneurship. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Huerta de Soto, J. 2011. “A Brief Note on Economic Recessions, Banking Reform, and the Future
of Capitalism”, in: Dejuán et al. 2011: 33–41.
Huerta de Soto, J. 2012. Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises
Institute.
Ikeda, S. 1997. Dynamics of the Mixed Economy. London: Routledge.
Understanding Financial Instability 33
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
Jablecki, J., and M. Machaj. 2001. “A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks’
Leverage”, in: Friedman. 2011: Chapter 8, 200–27.
Kates, S., ed. 2010. Macroeconomic Theory and Its Failings. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kates, S., ed. 2011. The Global Financial Crisis—What Have We Learnt?. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Kalecki. 1965 [2009]. Theory of Economic Dynamics. New York: George Allen & Unwin.
Keynes, J. M. 1930 [2011]. A Treatise on Money. Mansfield: Martino Publishing.
Keynes, J. M. 1936 [1997]. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York:
Prometheus Books.
Koo, R. C. 2015. The Escape From Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap. Singapore: Wiley.
Koppl, R. 2002. Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations. New York: Palgrave.
Koppl, R. 2014. From Crisis to Confidence: Macroeconomics After the Crash. London: IEA.
Koppl, R., and W. J. Luther. 2012. “Hayek, Keynes and Modern Macroeconomics.” Review of
Austrian Economics 25:223–41.
Kregel, J. A. 1992. “Minsky’s “Two-Price” Theory of Financial Instability and Monetary Policy:
Discounting versus Open Market Intervention,” in: Fazzari and Papadimitriou. 1992:
85–103.
Kregel, J. A. 2008. “Using Minsky’s Cushions of Safety to Analyze the Crisis in the U.S.
Subprime Mortgage Market”. International Journal of Political Economy 37 (1):3–23.
Kregel, J. A. 2013. “Political Economy Approaches to Financial Crisis: Hyman Minsky’s Financial
Fragility Hypothesis”, Chapter 8 in: Wolfson and Epstein. 2013: 159–71.
Lachmann, L. 1937 [1994]. “Uncertainty and Liquidity-Preference,” in: Lavoie (ed.). 1994: 29–41.
Lachmann, L. 1956 [1978]. Capital and Its Structure. Menlo Park: Institute for Humane Studies.
Lavoie, D., ed. 1994. Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions. London: Routledge.
Lavoie, M., and M. Seccareccia. 2001. “Minsky’s Financial Fragility Hypothesis: A Missing
Macroeconomic Link?”, in: R. Bellofiore and P. Ferri. 2001b: 76–96.
Leijonhufvud, A. 1981a. Information and Coordination—Essays in Macroeconomic Theory. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Leijonhufvud, A. 1981b. “The Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme”, in: Leijonhufvud.
1981a: 131–202.
Leijonhufvud, A. 2009. “Out Of the Corridor: Keynes and the Crisis.” Cambridge Journal of
Economics 33:741–57.
Machlup, F. 1976. “Hayek’s Contribution to Economics”, in: Machlup. (ed.). Essays on Hayek,
Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press: 13–59.
Mansharamani, V. 2011. Boombustology—Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Mehrling, P. 1999. “The Vision of Hyman P. Minsky.” Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 39:129–58.
Meltzer, A. H. 1988. Keynes’s Monetary Theory—a Different Interpretation. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Menger, C. 1871 [1994]. Principles of Economics. Grove City: Libertarian Press.
Minsky, H. P. 1975 [2008]. John Maynard Keynes. New York: McGraw Hill.
Minsky, H. P. 1982. Can “It” Happen Again—Essays on Instability and Finance. New York:
Sharpe.
Minsky, H. P. 1986 [2008]. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New York: McGraw Hill.
Minsky, H. P. 1987. “Securitization”. Policy Note 2008/2. Downloaded from Website The Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College.
34 L. Van Den Hauwe
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
Minsky, H. P. 1993. “On the Non-Neutrality of Money.” FRBNY Quarterly Review Spring: 77–82.
Minsky, H. P. 1994 [2012]. “Financial Instability Hypothesis”, in: Wray. 2012: 543–48.
Minsky, H. P. 2004. Induced Investment and Business Cycles. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mises, Lv. on. 1949 [1966]. Human Action—a Treatise on Economics, 4th revised edn.
New York: FEE.
Mishkin, F. S. 2013. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets. New York:
Pearson.
Murphy, D. 2009. Unravelling the Credit Crunch. London: CRC Press.
O’Driscoll, G. P. 2011. “Hayek and Keynes: What Have We Learned?”. The Journal of Private
Enterprise 27 (1):29–38.
O’Driscoll, G. P., and M. J. Rizzo. 1996. The Economics of Time and Ignorance. London:
Routledge.
Page West, G. III, and R. M. Whaples, eds. 2013. The Economic Crisis in Retrospect—
Explanations by Great Economists. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Papadimitriou, D. B. 2004. “Introduction”, in: Minsky. 2004: ix–xvi.
Papadimitriou, D. B., and L. Randall Wray. 2010. The Elgar Companion to Hyman Minsky.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Polleit, T., and M. von Prollius. 2010. Geldreform—Vom Schlechten Staatsgeld Zum Guten
Marktgeld. Grevenbroich: Lichtschlag Medien.
Posner, R. A. 2011. “The Causes of the Financial Crisis”, in: Friedman. 2011: 279–94.
Prychitko, D. L. 2010. “Competing Explanations of the Minsky Moment: The Financial Instability
Hypothesis in Light of Austrian Theory”. Review of Austrian Economics 23:199–221.
Rabin, A. A. 2004. Monetary Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Ravier, A. O. 2013. “Dynamic Monetary Theory and the Phillips Curve with a Positive Slope.”
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 16 (2):165–86.
Rodriguez, A., J. Turmo, and O. Vara. 2014. Financial Crisis and the Failure of Economic Theory.
London: Pickering & Chatto..
Rosser, J. B., M. V. Rosser, and M. Gallegati. 2012. “A Minsky-Kindleberger Perspective on the
Financial Crisis.” Journal of Economic Issues XLVI (2):449–58.
Rothbard, M. N. 1962 [2004]. Man, Economy, State. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Salin, P. 2010. Revenir Au Capitalisme—Pour Éviter Les Crisis. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Selgin, G. A. 1988. The Theory of Free Banking—Money Supply Under Competitive Note Issue.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Selgin, G. 1997. Less Than Zero—the Case for a Falling Price Level in a Growing Economy.
London: IEA.
Simpson, D. 2013. The Rediscovery of Classical Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Sinn, H.-W. 2010. Casino Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Skousen, M., ed. 1992. Dissent on Keynes—a Critical Appraisal of Keynesian Economics. New
York: Praeger.
Skousen, M. 2015. “Linking Austrian and Keynesian Economics: A Variation on a Theme”. The
Journal of Private Enterprise 30 (4):97–112.
Smith, V. L. 1991. Papers in Experimental Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, V. L., G. L. Suchanek, and A. W. Williams. 1988. “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous
Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets”, in: Smith, V.L. 1991: 339–71.
Smithin, J. 2013. Essays in the Fundamental Theory of Monetary Economics and
Macroeconomics. Singapore: World Scientific.
Understanding Financial Instability 35
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
Snowdon, B., and H. R. Vane. 2005. Modern Macroeconomics—Its Origins, Development and
Current State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Sorensen, P. B., and H. J. Whitta-Jacobsen. 2010. Introducing Advanced Macroeconomics—
Growth and Business Cycles. London: McGraw-Hill.
Spadaro, L. M. 1978. New Directions in Austrian Economics. San Francisco, CA: Institute for
Humane Studies.
Sraffa, P. 1932 [1995]. “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital”, in: Caldwell. 1995: 198–209.
Taylor, J. B. 2009. Getting Off Track—How Government Actions and Interventions Caused,
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Taylor, J. B. 2011. “Monetary Policy, Economic Policy and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical
Analysis of What Went Wrong”, in: Friedman. 2011: 150–71.
Tymoigne, E., and L. Randall Wray. 2014. The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism.
London: Routledge.
Van den Hauwe, L. 2005. “Constitutional Economics II”, in: Backhaus. 2005: 223–38.
Van den Hauwe, L. 2009a. Foundations of Business Cycle Research Volume I. Saarbrücken: VDM
Verlag.
Van den Hauwe, L. 2009b. Three Essays in Monetary Theory. Norderstedt: BoD.
Van den Hauwe, L. 2011a. “John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig Von Mises on Probability.” Journal
of Libertarian Studies 22 (1):471–507.
Van den Hauwe, L. 2011b. “Hayek, Gödel, and the Case for Methodological Dualism.” Journal of
Economic Methodology 18 (4):387–407.
Wallison, P. J. 2011. “Credit-Default Swaps and the Crisis”, in: Friedman. 2011: Chapter 10,
238–48.
White, L. H. 2011. “The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle”, in: Friedman. 2011:
Chapter 9, 228–37.
White, L. H. 2015. “Skepticism About Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Comment on
Flanders”. Econ Journal Watch 12 (1):106–13.
White, L. H., V. Vanberg, and E. Köhler. 2015. Renewing the Search for a Monetary
Constitution—Reforming Government’s Role in the Monetary System. Washington, DC:
The Cato Institue.
Wicksell, K. 1936 [1965]. Interest and Prices. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
Wolf, M. 2014. The Shifts and the Shocks. London: Allen Lane.
Wolfson, M. H., and G. A. Epstein. 2013. The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial
Crises. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wray, L. R. 1992. “Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Endogeneity of Money”, in:
Fazzari and Papadimitriou. 1992: 161–80.
Wray, L. R. 2012. Theories of Money and Banking Volume II. Cheltenham: Elgar Research
Collection.
Wray, L. R. 2013. “A Minskyan Road to Financial Reform”, Chapter 35 in: Wolfson and Epstein.
2013: 696–710.
Wray, L. R. 2016. Why Minsky Matters—an Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Yeager, L. 1988. “The Austrian School on Money and Gold.” Journal of Economic Studies 15
(3/4):92–105.
Zambelli, S., ed. 2010. Computable, Constructive and Behavioural Economic Dynamics. London:
Routledge.
36 L. Van Den Hauwe
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.06.16 18:44
